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ARTICLE

SHIFTING SCIENCE, CONSIDERED COSTS, AND STATIC
STATUTES: THE INTERPRETATION OF EXPANSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
Jason J. Czarnezki*
Congress often passes expansive legislation, frequently environmental and public health regulatory statutes, where both the definition of those items being regulated and the mandate have
significant breadth. How should these provisions be construed?
While it is difficult to establish a model which determines whether
to broadly or narrowly construe an expansive statutory provision,
factors that impact this choice include the existence of express limitations on the mandate, understandings of congressional intent, the
need to avoid regulation that might do more harm than good, the
nature of the regulated item, and intervening circumstances such as
new understandings in law, policy, or science. This Article sets out
to establish how, why, and when courts should broadly interpret
expansive environmental and public health legislation. Absent
express limitations requiring cost-benefit analysis or technological
feasibility, courts should broadly construe expansive environmental
legislation. Why? Courts are equipped to interpret the textual
mandate, the costs of a failure to regulate, even in an interim
period, are potentially great, and Congress, in recognition of
changed circumstances, was aware of the breadth of the textual
language; whereas courts should allow administrative agencies to
narrowly or broadly construe statutory provisions with such limitations subject to Chevron deference.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; A.B., J.D., University
of Chicago. I wish to thank Alison Barnes, Richard Epstein, William Ford, David Franklin,
Eric Goldman, Daniel Hamilton, Michael O'Hear, Michael Scodro, Carolyn Shapiro, and
Kirsten Rabe Smolensky for their helpful insights and suggestions. I also sincerely appreciate the comments received at the Chicago Junior Faculty Workshop and the University of
Virginia Environmental Law Journal Symposium.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Expansive definitions and mandates fill federal environmental
and public health statutes-administrative agencies must create
standards for "air pollutant emissions" that "endanger public
health or welfare,"' keep workplaces free from "hazards" that "are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm, '"2 and develop
"drinking water regulation" for any contaminant that "may have
an adverse effect on the health of persons."3 In evaluating the
action or inaction of administrative agencies pursuant to these provisions, judges must often choose between broad or narrow construction. Statutes are often narrowly construed, as a result of
lawful and unlawful agency action,4 but frequently statutes contain
provisions that limit any attempt at broad construction (e.g.,
requiring that costs be considered).5 Nevertheless, courts and
agencies become anxious when interpreting expansive environmental statutory mandates, and this nervousness leads to narrowness of, ironically, textually broad statutory language. It is difficult
to establish a model to determine whether to broadly or narrowly
construe an expansive federal statutory provision that delegates
authority to an administrative agency to protect environmental and
public health. However, factors that impact this choice include the
existence of express limitations on the mandate, understandings of
I Clean

Air Act (CAA) § 108(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(1) (2000).
2 Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) § 5, 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2004).
3 Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (2000).
4 See, e.g., Am. Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding EPA's decision not to regulate lead at the water tap). See also Jason J.Czarnezki &
Adrianne K. Zahner, The Utility of Non-Use Values in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 32 B.C. ENvn.. AiHi:. L. RiJv. 509 (2005) (critiquing the Department of Interior
regulations, promulgated pursuant to CERCLA, that narrowly construe non-use values);
Jason J.Czarnezki, Comment, Defining the Project Purpose under NEPA: Promoting Consideration of Viable EIS Alternatives, 70 U. Cm.L. Rivv. 599 (2003) (addressing whether
agencies can narrowly or broadly construe a project purpose when considering alternatives
under the National Environmental Policy Act's environmental impact statement

requirement).
5 See infra Part II.A.
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congressional intent, the need to avoid regulation that might do
more harm than good, the nature of the regulated item or substance, and intervening circumstances such as new understandings
in law, policy, or science.
The choice between broad versus narrow construction not only
affects the singular provision at issue, but also implicitly affects the
institutional relationships between Congress, administrative agencies, and the judiciary in the environmental context.6 Absent
express limitations requiring cost-benefit analysis or technological
feasibility, courts should broadly construe expansive environmental
legislation. Why? Courts are equipped to interpret the textual
mandate, the costs of a failure to regulate, even in an interim
period, are potentially great, and Congress, in recognition of
changed circumstances, was aware of the breadth of the textual
language; whereas courts should allow administrative agencies to
narrowly or broadly construe statutory provisions with such limitations subject to Chevron deference.7 As a result, the judiciary will
not create irreparable environmental and public health harm due
to insufficient regulation. Moreover, Congress can still choose not
to regulate, through later statutory action, and agencies, through
standard-setting, can create appropriate, even if minimal, standards. Thus, broad interpretation of expansive legislation without
limitations makes good sense where Congress has delegated
authority to an administrative agency to protect public health and
the environment, and significant harm might accrue between the
time of narrow judicial interpretation and any legislative or administrative agency action.
This Article, limited to the environmental law context, sets out
to establish how, why, and when courts should broadly interpret
6 See generally E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 V11.1.. ENvIl
L.J. 1 (2005); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 CoiLUm. L. Rivv. 452 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MiJI . L. Rijv. 885, 927 (2003).
7 Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (requiring

courts to give deference to an agency's statutory interpretations when the statute is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is reasonable). It would also be reasonable to characterize the suggested level of deference as not subject to Chevron step two, but instead as a
judicial interpretation of a clear statute under Chevron step one authorizing an expert
agency to balance a variety of considerations (i.e., limitations), subject to hard look review.
See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1947) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2005)); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.

402, 416 (1971). In either case, balancing is left to the agency as prescribed by Congress,
and courts only evaluate the reasonableness of the choice under Chevron or the hard look
doctrine.

398

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 24:395

expansive environmental and public health legislation, focusing on
whether broad statutory construction should be an interpretive
principle in at least some instances. Part II of this Article recognizes Congress's affinity for broad statutory provisions in environmental law, analyzes statutes containing expansive definitions and
mandates, and suggests what characteristics are required to broadly
construe expansive legislation in changing scientific circumstances.
Part III confronts the conflict between scientific advances and the
law, argues that expansive legislation, when directed at environmental or public health, must be broadly construed, and evaluates
the institutional consequences for such a view of statutory interpretation. Part IV suggests judicial limitations when broadly interpreting expansive statutory provisions. The Article concludes by
evaluating the consequences of a broad, yet text-based, interpretive approach to environmental legislation.
II.

INTERPRETING EXPANSIVE LEGISLATION

Congress often passes expansive legislation, frequently regulatory environmental and public health statutes, where both the definition of the items being regulated and the mandate have
significant breadth.8 How should these provisions be construed
when the statute contains no specific listing of what can be subject
to the regulation or what factors should be considered in meeting
the statutory mandate?
While Congress could create a discrete list of substances to regulate and circumstances under which to regulate, it rarely does the
former9 and does not do the latter as frequently as it could. This is
not a criticism, for Congress likely is aware that new scientific discoveries will often alter any regulatory scheme. Legislative inefficiency would result if statutes required amendment every time, for
example, a new pollutant was discovered. Thus, the judiciary and
administrative agencies have the balance of power in interpreting
expansive legislation.' 0 Focusing on examples in the environmen8 See Richard J. Lazarus, CongressionalDescent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy
in Environmental Law, 94 Gvo. L. J. 619, 622 (2006) (stating that Congresses have passed
sweeping and demanding environmental laws).
9 Congress often creates an initial list of pollutants, but this list can be revised. See, e.g.,
CAA §§ 112(b)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2000) (initial list of hazardous air pollutants
which must be periodically revised).
10 Cf. Farina, supra note 6, at 452-53 ("For those who study the interaction of courts and
agencies, one of the most persistently intriguing puzzles has been to define the appropriate
judicial and administrative roles in the interpretation of regulatory statutes."). Compare
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (giving deference to an agency's statutory interpretations
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tal law context, this Part discusses, first, expansive legislation that
contains guidance limiting broad interpretation and, second,
expansive provisions without any such limitations.
A.

Expansive Statutes with Limitations

Expansive statutes are synonymous with public and environmental health legislation seeking to mitigate the imposition of negative
externalities on human welfare. In light of their scope, Congress
often limits broad interpretation of the statutory mandates by
including provisions that restrict how the statutory mandate must
be implemented. Thus, while a statute authorizes agency regulation of a substance that endangers human health, that substance
may only be regulated after costs are considered, using existing
technology, or if feasible.
Two environmental and public health statutes, the Safe Drinking
Water Act' ("SDWA") and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act' 2 ("FIFRA"), are illustrative. The SDWA protects public health by regulating naturally-occurring and man-made
contaminants in the nation's drinking water supply.' 3 The SDWA
requires promulgation of standards including maximum contaminant level goals ("MCLGs") and maximum contaminant levels
("MCLs").

14

As the term "goal" would suggest, the MCLGs are

aspirational, and are set at levels "at which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur which allows
for an adequate margin of safety."' 5 The MCLs are set as close to
the MCLG as "feasible."' 6 In addition to this expansive mandate
(i.e., to regulate known or anticipated adverse effects on human
health), what constitutes a "contaminant" is equally expansive"any physical, chemical, biological, or radiological substance or
' 7
matter in water.'
when Congress expressly or implicitly delegates exclusive interpretative authority over that
statute to an agency) with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq. (1996).
12 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq. (1996).
13 EPA, Understanding the Safe Drinking Water Act 1 (2004), http://www.epa.gov/safewater/sdwal30th/factsheets/pdfs/fs_30ann sdwaweb.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
"4 42 U.S.C. § 300g-](b)(4) (1996).
15 Id. § 300g-l(b)(4)(A).
16 Id. § 300g-l(b)(4)(B).
'7 Id. § 300f(6).
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Yet, this does not mean that the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA")' is required to regulate all substances
that might enter public water systems and could conceivably cause
harm. The EPA must only set a MCL if "it is economically and
technologically feasible" to measure the contamination level in
public water systems, 19 and must only set the MCL as close to the
' 2 1 _MCLG as the benefits outweigh the costs 20 and "as is feasible
defined as using the "best technology, treatment techniques, and
other means.., available (taking cost into consideration). 2 2 Thus,
for example, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the EPA was not
required to set an MCL for lead because lead contamination
23
results from pipe corrosion in homes and distribution systems.
According to the D.C. Circuit in American Water Works, Congress
"contemplated that an MCL would be a standard by which both
the quality of the drinking water and the public water system's
efforts to reduce the contaminant could be measured. ' 24 "[A]n
MCL for lead would be neither" because regulation would not be
feasible in light of where the contamination arose, and because
compliance with a lead MCL might increase other contaminant
levels as a result of adding anti-corrosion chemicals to the water
supply.25 Hence, the SDWA is a statute which specifies limitations,
cost-benefit analysis (allowed) and feasibility (required), on the
aggressive statutory mandate. These limitations require expert balancing by the administrative agency, and courts do, and should,
defer to agency interpretations of statutory provisions requiring
cost-benefit analysis, feasibility, or reasonableness. The D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA's definition of "feasible" in American Water
Works under the Chevron doctrine.26
18 The EPA administers the SDWA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300f(7)-(8) (1996).
19 42 U.S.C. § 300f(l)(C)(i) (1996).
20

42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i) (1996) (EPA must analyze "[q]uantifiable and non-

quantifiable" costs and benefits); Id. § 300g-l(b)(6) (The EPA may have a more lenient
MCL if the "benefits of the MCL ... would not justify the costs of complying with the

level.").
21 Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B).
22
23

Id. § 300g-l(b)(5).
Am. Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Id.

24
25 Id.
26 Id.

See also Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) ("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers,
it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
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Similar to the statutory mandate in the SDWA, FIFRA regulates
pesticides "to the extent necessary to prevent unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment,"27 where "environment"
includes "water, air, land, and all plants and man and other animals
living therein and the interrelationships which exist among
these. '28 Because it is hard to imagine that a pesticide would not
have some "adverse effect" on the ecosystem, the effect must be
"unreasonable"-a word usually connoting that some sort of balancing must commence. Under FIFRA, the EPA must "tak[e] into
account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits
of the use of the pesticide. '29 No doubt that, in many instances, a
zero pollutant or contaminant goal is both unattainable and unwise
because negative externalities accompany nearly all beneficial
products or consumer goods. But in some cases, a maximum pollutant level is absolutely necessary regardless of costs or available
technology-if a safe level is unattainable, sometimes a complete
ban may even be necessary. Statutes can inform the administrative
agencies whether to balance interests, like FIFRA or SDWA, or
can inform the courts to broadly interpret statutory mandates with30
out such limitations.
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."). However, courts should be reluctant, absent such limitations, to narrowly construe statutory provisions or defer to the regulating agency. For further discussion of the role of courts versus agencies in interpreting expansive
environmental legislation, see infra Part Ill.
27 FIFRA § 3(a), 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) (1996).
28

FIFRA § 2(j), 7 U.S.C. § 1360) (1996).

29

FIFRA § 2(bb), 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1996).

30 This is not to say that courts have not exerted their authority to define the steps of the
decision-making process under the relevant statute. See generally Indus. Union Dept. v.
Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Corrosion Proof Fittings v.

EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting TSCA). Nevertheless, agencies may be in
a better position to determine how to best engage in complex analyses, while courts must
ensure that such steps are consistent with the statutory text and recognize that agency
deference is appropriate where the steps are subject to a number of reasonable interpretations. See infra note 8& Due to the complexity of these cost-benefit calculations and feasi-

bility limitations, it is not unreasonable to support a cautious judicial role, combined with
agency deference. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121
(1985); contra The Benzene Case. I note that in any event courts often construe statutes to

have their broadest meaning consistent with the overall statutory purpose. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995); Maura D.
Corrigan & J. Michael Thomas, "Dice Loading" Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 59

N.Y.U. ANN. Stijv. AM. L. 231, 232 (2003) (noting the canon that remedial statutes should
be broadly construed).
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Expansive Statutes without Limitations

In construing expansive legislation without express limitations,"
the judiciary must determine (1) whether the statute allows for
consideration of certain criteria when regulating, and (2) whether
the statute requires or allows a federal agency to assert its jurisdiction at all.
The voluminous Clean Air Act ("CAA") is a prime example of
expansive legislation raising the first issue. While containing
numerous ambitious mandates, Congress chose, in some instances,
not to include express limitations on how to achieve the CAA's
goals. Under section 108 of the CAA, the EPA, for the purpose of
creating national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") under
section 109,32 must list air pollutant emissions "which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. '33 In a
parallel provision, the EPA must regulate air pollutants from new
motor vehicles meeting the same criteria .3 4 Like most regulatory
statutes, the CAA broadly defined the harm (air pollutants)-any
"substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the
35
ambient air."
Unlike the CAA's new source performance standards 36 and hazardous air pollutant standards, 7 the NAAQS and motor vehicle
emission standards contain no express implementation limitations,
such as requiring cost-benefit analysis or technological feasibility
considerations. The Supreme Court, in American Trucking Associ31 In the environmental law context, such statutes might be said to contain only pure
health-based standards.
32 CAA § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000) (standards must be "based on such
criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety. . . requisite to protect the public
health.").
33 CAA § 108(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2000).
34 CAA § 302(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(1) (2000).
35 CAA § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000).

36 CAA § III(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(]) (2000) (creating an emissions standard
"which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the
best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such
reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.").
37CAA § 112(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (2000) ("Emissions standards promulgated
under this subsection and applicable to new or existing sources of hazardous air pollutants
shall require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air pollutants
subject to this section (including a prohibition on such emissions, where achievable) that
the Administrator, taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction,
and any non-air quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements, determines is achievable.").
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ation v. Whitman,38 upheld the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that "economic considerations [may] play no part in the promulgation of
ambient air quality standards" ' 39 because "[n]owhere are the costs
4
of achieving such a standard made part of that initial calculation.
The CAA's mandate is a blank check to create NAAQS "allowing
an adequate margin of safety

' 41

so long as the standard "accurately

reflect[s] the latest scientific knowledge" in determining the effects
on public health.42
In addition to determining what an agency must consider when
regulating, it is the quintessential judicial function to determine if
the agency has the jurisdiction to regulate or must regulate at all.
For example, in Riverside Bayview Homes and SWANCC, the
Supreme Court questioned whether the United States Army Corps
of Engineers maintained jurisdiction to regulate the discharge of
fill in certain types of wetlands under the Clean Water Act.43 In

defining the scope of protection of the nation's waterways, courts
have looked at the statutory text, 44 determining whether wetlands
are "waters of the United States.

'4 5

Science often permeates these

jurisdictional decisions-Is the wetland connected to a traditionally
navigable waterway? Is the connection direct, or via indirect or
38 Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Whitman (ATA v. Whitman), 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
39 Id. at 465-66 (affirming Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
40

Id.

41 CAA § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000).
42 CAA § 108(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (2000). Here is a circumstance where the
agency has deference to the proper standard for a pollutant, but it does not have deference
to determine if a pollutant should be regulated at all. See infra Part Ill.
43 CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474
U.S. 121 (1985); Solid Waste Agency of Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001). The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a
consolidated case to further determine the scope of federal jurisdiction over wetlands
under the Clean Water Act and the Commerce Clause. See Rapanos v. United States, 126
U.S. 414 (2005); Carabell v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 126 U.S. 415 (2005).
44 Compare SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (asserting that the definition of "navigable
waters" is clear under Chevron step one), with Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 132
(asserting that "navigable waters" is ambiguous). Under a broad interpretive principle,
SWANCC would be correct to the extent that the statutory text is unambiguous under
Chevron step one, but SWANCC construes the statutory text too narrowly. See SWANCC,
531 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress intended navigable waters to
have the broadest possible meaning (citing S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972))).
Admittedly, this leaves an unresolved question as to whether stare decisis regarding the
ambiguity of the text should trump the broad interpretive principle. Though in this case,
either would result in the same outcome considering the broad construction of navigable
waters by the Corps and the holding of Riverside Bayview Homes.
45 CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000) (defining "navigable waters" as "waters of
the United States").
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seasonal water flow? Does the wetland flow to a river through an
underwater hydrological connection?
Expansive regulatory legislation designed to protect the public
health and the environment must rely on scientific expertise in
order to know what to regulate now and what to regulate in the
future, including pollutants and areas of protection not contemplated at the time of the enactment. For example, air quality criteria existed for only six pollutants in 1971, and while "some
uncertainty about health effects of air pollution is inevitable," the
EPA properly added lead as a seventh criteria air pollutant.4 6
Also, advances in scientific knowledge might suggest that discharges into isolated wetlands connected to traditionally navigable
waterways through underground hydrologic channels have a far
47
greater impact on water quality than previously envisioned. Similarly, scientific and medical knowledge about the dangers of
tobacco and nicotine has grown over the past fifty years. 48 As a
result, science must play an unusual role in expansive legislation
without express limitations that determine the scope of agency
jurisdiction because the baseline scientific findings may be disputed. As science progresses, the chances decrease that Congress
would have contemplated regulation of the harmful substance at
issue (e.g., tobacco or greenhouse gases or wetlands fill).
In interpreting expansive legislation, the choice is between a
static 49 (what was contemplated at the time of enactment) or
dynamic interpretation 50 (interpretation in light of changed circum46 See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1154, 1184 (1980). Sulfur oxides, particulates, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxidants were regulated at

the time the CAA was enacted. Nitrogen oxides were added in 1971. Rointwr V. PitwtRixtnUI.ATION: LAW, SCI:N(F, ANt) PoI.w 502 (4th ed.
VAL ET Ai.., ENVIRONMENTAI
2003).
47 Cf Rapanos, supra note 43. Hydrological connection to navigable waterways may be
a sufficient basis for the Corps to assert jurisdiction over a wetland.
48 Cf FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 188 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). The FDA certainly had more information about the dangers of tobacco in
1996 (when it attempted to assert its jurisdiction over tobacco) than Congress had in 1938
(when the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act was enacted). For further discussion of Brown &
Williamson, see infra Part IV.A.
49 See ANTONIN SCAIA, A MATI-TR OF INTFItI'TATION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(advocating his philosophy of textualism, an approach that focuses on the original meaning
of the text to be interpreted); Jason J.Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 Mr. L. Ri~v. 841, 852 (2006)
(citing Ktl irr
E. WI r-7'NGTON, CONSTITUTIONAl. INT.IPFRTEATION 35 (1999); Rontwr
BORK, Tin TiiMlI-tING oF: AMI:tICA (1997)).
50 WII.t.IAM N. ESKRID.GE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTtIAATION 50 (1994)
("Especially over time, the circumstances will not be ones that the statute or the drafters
contemplated, and any application of the statute will be dynamic in a weak sense, going

2006]

Expansive Environmental Legislation

405

stances such as new law or new scientific understanding and discov-

ery).'

The choice is not difficult when lower courts must simply

follow an intervening ruling of the Supreme Court.5 2 Often, however, the choice is not so clear, for example, when despite the
understanding at the time of enactment, horizontal persuasive precedent has developed 53 or when scientific understanding has
shifted to the point where the statutory meaning would not have
conformed with the expectations of the original drafters and legislators who passed the statute.5 4 But absent textual limitations, how
broadly should judges interpret expansive environmental legislation, especially in those instances when intervening scientific
knowledge might favor a broader construction?
We can assess this query by way of a more detailed exampledid Congress know that greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide,
might be regulated under the CAA? Perhaps so; perhaps not"the legislative history contains a few stray references to humanforced climate change. ' ' 55 But fact-specific legislative intent is not
beyond the drafters' expectations."); Peter Strauss, Statutes that are not Static-The Case of
the APA, http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia/plt/papers/0584 (arguing that the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) can be shaped by events after enactment) (last visited Apr. 12, 2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HAizv. L. Ri:v. 405, 493-97 (1989) (discussing statutory interpretation in light of changed
circumstances or obsolescence).
51 Admittedly, this is a false dichotomy when Congress envisioned at the time of enactment that the statute's regulatory scope would increase over time.
52 Cf Strauss, supra note 50, at I (questioning whether textual meaning can be shaped
by subsequent events such as "intervening judicial decisions").
53 By horizontal persuasive precedent, I refer to a common understanding and meaning
established by the legal profession and lower courts. See id. at 2 (arguing that, in the
context of the APA, the Supreme Court "should accord substantial weight to contemporary consensus the profession and lower courts have been able to develop in interpreting
law").
54 Pursuant to section 202(1) of the CAA, part of the 1990 Amendments, the Act
requires the EPA to set standards to control hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles.
In 2001, EPA listed MBTE as a mobile source hazardous air pollutant. Control of Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,229, 17,235 (Mar.
29, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 80, 86). (MTBE has also been banned by a number of
states based on the concern that it enters underground drinking water supplies.) However,
MBTE had been used since 1979 as an octane enhancer, and used, beginning in 1992, at
higher concentrations in some gasoline to fulfill the Act's oxygenate requirements. Thus,
Congress might not have "expected" MBTE, at the time of passage or in 2001, to be regulated as a hazardous air pollutant.
55 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing 111 CONG. Rlc(,. 25,061
(daily ed. Sept. 24, 1965); 116 CON6. Ri:i. 32,914 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970)). State petitioners' request for rehearing and rehearing en bane was denied. See Massachusetts. v. EPA,
433 F.3d 66, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Massachusetts. v. EPA, No. 03-1361, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26560 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 2, 2005). The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari. Massachusetts v. EPA, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006) (mem.).
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relevant where Congress seeks to mitigate public harm via expansive statutes that intrinsically provide for the addition of items to
be regulated, as is the case here. 56 "The fact that a statute can be
applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does
not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth. ' 57 Thus,
courts should rely on the statutory text (i.e., permit jurisdiction and
mandate regulation under the plain meaning of the text pursuant
to Chevron step one).
In the greenhouse gas context, the issue is not only whether the
agency has the jurisdiction to regulate,58 but also whether the
agency is required to do so. The federal government has not mitigated carbon dioxide emissions5 9 under the Clean Air Act despite
the ambitious plain language of the text. In Massachusetts v. EPA,
the D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA's decision that the agency should
not regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under
the CAA. 61 In dissent, D.C. Circuit Judge Tatel argued that greenhouse gases "plainly fall within the meaning" of air pollutants to be
regulated under the Act.6 ' Tatel continued, stating that if the EPA
administrator finds that the gases contribute to air pollution that
puts the public's health in danger, "then EPA has authority56 While fact-specific intent may not be relevant (i.e., intent as to whether to regulate a
specific item), intent may be relevant to the extent that Congress was unsure what science
will show in the future, but nevertheless wanted to delegate authority to regulate. See, e.g.,
CAA § 169A(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7491 (a)(1) (2000) ("Congress hereby declares as a national
goal the prevention of any future, and the remedying of any existing, impairment of visibility in mandatory class I Federal areas which impairment results from manmade air pollution.") (emphasis added); COMM. ON ENVIRONMINT AND PUBLIC WORKS, U.S. S;NATIi,
10313 CONG., LiXiISI.ArIV HisiORY 01 "'1n11CIiAN Aji Acr AMFNIMINTS OF 1990, at
980 (1993) (Senator Baucus introducing report entitled Clean Air Act Amendment Costs
and Economic Effects: A Review of PublishedStudies) ("It is appropriate, particularly in a
wealthy society, that the public be protected from the unseen and unknown hazards which
can result from exposure to certain air pollutants."); Id. at 2898. (quoting Representative
Wolpe) ("There are some toxic pollutants whose true risks are still unknown. We must
ensure that as future risks become known they are properly regulated. These air toxics
provisions will help give us these assurances.").
57 PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 (2001) (quoting Pa. Dept. of Corrections v.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1952)).
58 In the wetlands cases, for example, the Corps was asserting its jurisdiction. See cases
cited in supra note 43.
59 Other greenhouse gases include methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons.
60 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding the EPA's decision
that it should not regulate carbon dioxide as a proper exercise of discretion), cert. granted
126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006). See also Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and
Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003) (EPA also concluding that it cannot
regulate greenhouse gases relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Brown & Williamson
cautioning against regulation of "unusually significant economic and political issues.").
61 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 73 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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indeed, the obligation-to regulate their emissions from motor

vehicles. "62
Finding breadth, as Judge Tatel did, in interpreting expansive
legislation without limitations is appropriate especially in those circumstances where new scientific understanding will lead to
increased regulation (because more and more human-created substances will be found to endanger human health). But what about
concerns of political accountability and institutional capacity? The
elected members of Congress have chosen expansive language, and
judges certainly are able to evaluate baseline science such as
whether an emission may "reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health and welfare." Here, the adverse effects of global climate change are well documented.6 3 Thus, where there is an
expansive statutory mandate, judges must determine if something
should be regulated under the text of the statute (e.g., do greenhouses gases contribute to global climate change?). 64 A finding of
62 Id. A parallel argument was successfully made by plaintiffs in Lead Industries Ass'n
v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (1980), where the D.C. Circuit held that, if the EPA found lead
emissions to endanger health and welfare, a nondiscretionary duty to list it as a criteria air
pollutant arose. Thus, this argument might prove persuasive in both section 202 and 108
suits under the Clean Air Act. See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratoriesfor Local Solitions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to
Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PiNN Si. ENVii . L. Rivv. 15, 75-78
(2004). But the EPA, relying on FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000), concluded that "in light of the enormous economic and political consequences of
regulating greenhouse gas emissions, Congress would have been far more specific if it had
intended to authorize EPA to regulate the subject under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act."
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 56 n.1.
63 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, A Report of Working Group 11 of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, http://
www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wg2/005.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
64 In other words, the court need not find the statute to be ambiguous under Chevron
step one. This is the case despite the "in his judgment language" of section 202 of the
CAA. Compare Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976), with Judge Tatel's dissent
in Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 79-80 ("The statutory standard, moreover, is precautionary. At the time we decided Ethyl, section 202(a)(1) and similar CAA provisions
either authorized or required the Administrator to act on finding that emissions led to 'air
pollution which endangers the public health or welfare.' After Ethyl found that 'the statutes and common sense demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is
less than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable,' the 1977 Congress not only approved of
this conclusion, but also wrote it into the CAA. Section 202(a)(1) (along with other provisions) now requires regulation to precede certainty. It requires regulation where, in the
Administrator's judgment, emissions 'contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipatedto endanger public health or welfare.' As the House Report explained: 'In order
to emphasize the precautionary or preventative purpose of the act (and, therefore, the
Administrator's duty to assess risks rather than wait for proof of actual harm), the committee not only retained the concept of endangerment to health; the committee also added the
words 'may reasonably be anticipated to."') (internal citations omitted). See also Sunstein,
supra note 50, at 465 (arguing that such words allow "discretion to decide on the tolerance
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definite harm is not required, only a finding that endangerment can
be reasonably anticipated.6 5 As a result, courts should interpret

the language broadly, permitting and requiring regulation, regardless of whether an agency has made the decision to regulate (e.g.,
wetlands fill or tobacco) or has decided not to (e.g., greenhouse
gases). Agencies should decide whether a substance should be regulated only if textual limitations exist requiring sophisticated costbenefit balancing or cost considerations or technological feasibility,
and agencies should receive deference and must face political realities when deciding where, not if (absent express limitations), to put
the level or standard of regulation (e.g., what level is "requisite to
protect the public health" "allowing for an adequate margin of
66

safety").

level but do not confer on him discretion not to promulgate regulations at all."). Broad
construction of statutory provisions where the purpose is to prevent harm to human health
may also apply beyond environmental statutes, see, e.g., OSHA § 5, 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2000),
and outside the context of administrative agencies where changed scientific circumstances
may play less of a role. I encourage other scholars to assess the appropriateness of this
Article's broad interpretive principle to other areas of law, especially where a statute is
remedial in nature and seeks to avert harm to human welfare (e.g., health law, employment
discrimination). For example, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
("EMTALA") requires that hospitals with an open emergency room provide assessment
and treatment to stabilize a person who presents themselves there, regardless of payment
sources. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(a), (h) (2000). While science and technology clearly improve
over time in the medical profession, hospitals are under no obligation to employ new technology to comply with EMTALA. Hospitals must only do the best they can with available
resources. If someone arrives at an emergency room who is so ill or traumatized that he or
she cannot be stabilized, the hospital is left with the cost using the resources available. Id.
§ 1395dd(b)(1). Judicial interpretation of EMTALA has been broad without allowing for
cost consideration, see, e.g., In the Matter of Baby K, 832 F.Supp 1022, 1027 (E.D. Va.
1993), affd 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), resulting in emergency room closures and strict
liability for hospitals. See Nathanael J.Scheer, Keeping the Promise: FinancingEMTALA's
Guaranteeof Emergency Medical Carefor Undocumented Aliens in Arizona, 35 Aliz.S'r.
L.J. 1413, 1415 (2003); Mark J. Garwin, Immunity in the Absence of Charity: EMTALA and
the Eleventh Amendment, 23 S. lii.. U. L.J. 1, 4 (1998). Despite its consequences, broad
interpretation of EMTALA may be appropriate because there is a broad statutory mandate without limitations that seeks to stop a public harm, in this case "patient dumping" or
death and injury due to transport when not medically stabilized.
65 Cf.Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1153-54 (discussing the precautionary nature of the CAA); Ethyl Corp, 541 F.2d at 25 ("Awaiting certainty will often allow
for only reactive, not preventive, regulation.").
66 Agencies are likely in the best position to determine "how safe is safe." See Michael
S. Baram, Use of Comparative Risk Methods in Regulatory and Common Law, 13 Coi lM.
J. ENV'I.. L. 1, 3 (1987) (determining that the appropriate risk limit is within the province
of agency judgment and judicial review).
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BROAD INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLE

Law and science have had a troubled marriage. Good science
can generate consensus in a discipline, but science is rarely dispositive. 67 Yet, while the law seeks certainty, 68 Congress must pass
expansive legislation to account for changes over time.69 Courts
may be able to evaluate scientific consensus (e.g., does global
warming exist?), but administrative agencies might be better left
with the details (e.g., what are the proper regulatory standards and
requirements for compliance in order to mitigate greenhouse gas
production?). Even so, difficult science makes for difficulty in creating law.7° It is difficult for a judge to be a "faithful servant'
when faced with expansive legislation, especially in light of new
scientific discoveries. However, for those environmental statutes
with expansive mandates seeking to prevent public harms (without
any limitations on how the harm should be regulated), judges are
being faithful servants by broadly construing the mandates and
requiring regulation by the prescribed agency.
Proper interpretation of expansive environmental legislation
requires confidence that such an interpretation conforms with the
appropriate institutional relationships that Congress (and the Constitution) envisioned between the judiciary and administrative
agencies.72 On the one hand, "[t]o determine 'what the law is' in
the context of an actual controversy that turns on a question of
statutory meaning is the quintessential judicial function. At the
same time, however, such questions are so bound up with successful administration of the regulatory scheme that it may seem only
sensible to give principal interpretive responsibility to the 'expert'
agency that lives with the statute constantly. ' 73 A model where
courts broadly interpret expansive environmental legislation without limitations, and agencies are left to construe other statutes,
67 See Oliver Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage:Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 302 Sci. 1926 (2003).
68 Id.

69 Lead Industries, 647 F.2d at 1152 ("Rather, as scientific knowledge expands and analytical techniques are improved, new information is uncovered which indicates that pollution levels that were once considered harmless are not in fact harmless.").
70 Cf. Houck, supra note 67.

71 Cf. Strauss, supra note 50, at 8.
72 In addition, "solid evidence of what, if anything, Congress 'typically' intends with
respect to statutory interpretation is hard to come by." Farina, supra note 6, at 471.
73 Id. at 452-53. See also id. at 468 ("Alternatively, Congress may recognize that its
words will require interpretation and assume that the court will resolve questions of statutory meaning in the normal course of appropriate litigation."); cases cited supra note 10
(comparing Chevron and Marbury).
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broadly or narrowly, subject to Chevron deference strikes the
proper balance. Rarely should courts narrowly construe expansive
provisions that contain no express limitations,74 but the scope of
this broad interpretive principle is not infinite as discussed in infra
Part IV.
Chevron deference is appropriate where agency expertise is
required. 5 In some instances, "Congress both perceives the need
for future interpretation and formulates an intent that it be accomplished by the agency." 76 However, "in Chevron itself the Supreme
Court faced a question of how - and not whether - the CAA
applied to certain sources of air emissions. ' 77 Thus courts decide

"whether" regulation is required, not "how." Agencies can only
construe "whether" when explicit limitations exist, and otherwise
determine "how." Instances appropriate for agency construction
are evidenced by express limitations requiring cost-benefit balancing or deciding technological feasibility. In other words, Congress
has expressed an explicit textual desire for additional expert con74 Arguably, narrow construction of expansive legislation might be perceived as a sort of
information-forcing default where Congress will be forced to act if it chooses to regulate.
Cf Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YAii L.J. 87, 127-28 (1989) ("When parties fail to contract
because they want to shift the ex ante transaction cost to a subsidized ex post court determination, a penalty default of non-enforcement may be appropriate. When strategic considerations cause a more knowledgeable party not to raise issues that could improve
contractual efficiency, a default that penalizes the more informed party may encourage the
revelation of information."). See also infra Part IV.A. However, broad interpretation
means that the judiciary will not create irreparable harm due to insufficient regulation, and
Congress and agencies can later remedy any perceived judicial error through legislation or
notice and comment rulemaking Thus, broad interpretation in some circumstances makes
good sense where Congress has delegated authority to an administrative agency to protect
public health and the environment, and significant harm might accrue between the time of
narrow judicial interpretation and any legislative or administrative agency action. See, e.g,
PI CiVAL, supra note 46, at 379 ("What OSHA left unsaid was that, due to judicial intervention [by narrowly construing the Occupational Safety and Health Act in The Benzene
Case], it had taken ten years to lower the benzene [permissible exposure limit] to the very
levels the Agency had sought to adopt on an emergency basis in May 1977."). In addition,
broad construction can also act as an information forcing device to promote political
accountability and Congressional action. For example, the Food Quality Protection Act, 21
U.S.C. § 321, was passed following the Ninth Circuit's expansive interpretation of the
Delaney Clause in Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992).
75 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'il L. 193, 207 (1996); Karin
P. Sheldon, "It's Not My Job To Care": Understanding Justice Scalia's Method of Statutory
Interpretation Through Sweet Home and Chevron, 24 B.C. ENVIi.. Aii,. L. Rivv. 487, 493
(1997) (both noting that agency expertise is a justification for Chevron deference).
76 Farina, supra note 6, at 468.
77 Richard A. Merrill, The FDA May Not Regulate Tobacco Products as "Drugs" or as
"Medical Devices," 47 DuKi7 L.J. 1071, 1090 (1998).
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siderations in order to determine the scope of the statutory mandate. Absent such an expression, judges, not bureaucrats or
technocrats, must define the scope of the expansive statutory
provision.
To allow deference to agencies for all types of expansive legislation would weaken judicial control over administrative agencies in
derogation of Congress's "meta-intent" and the judiciary's responsibility to determine the lawful limits of government action."8 If
Congress desires administrative deference, it must provide the
agencies with principles and considerations (which this Article calls
"limitations") by which to construe an otherwise expansive statutory mandate.7 9 Such limitations may be worthwhile because, for
example, "the economic cost of implementing a very stringent standard might produce health losses sufficient to offset the health
gains achieved in cleaning the air-for example, by closing down
whole industries and thereby impoverishing workers and consumers dependent upon those industries."8 0 This conclusion does not
subvert the advantage of political accountability in Chevron deference;8" for policy considerations inevitably play a role in setting any
health-based standard. Initially, a broad interpretive principle by
the judiciary prevents courts and agencies from prohibiting any
regulation of an item which falls under the expansive textual mandate; such prohibition might have great costs if harms occur in the
time between judicial decision and any subsequent curative congressional or administrative action. Following an initial broad judicial interpretation, agencies would be forced to engage in
deliberative and technocratic processes (e.g., notice and comment
rulemaking) to determine the proper scope of environmental
regulation.
Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72
L. Rjiv. 271,287-92 (1986); Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative
Era, 39 ADMIN. L. Ri:v. 353, 367-71 (1987).
79 Cf. Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Whitman (ATA v. Whitman), 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)
(requiring Congress, when conferring decision-making authority upon agencies, to provide
by legislative act an intelligible principle).
80 Id. at 466.
81 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) ("In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within
the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the
agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.").
78
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Absent express limitations, courts should only be concerned with
expanding what should be regulated in light of changed circumstances. Thus, courts should also take great care not to fashion
implicit default rules, such as allowing cost considerations not
explicitly required by Congress, when agencies implement statutory provisions.8" In Michigan v. EPA,8 3 the D.C. Circuit
addressed whether the statutory meaning of "contribute significantly" under the State Implementation Plan ("SIP") provision of
the CAA allowed for cost considerations.84 A SIP must contain a
program that prevents "emissions activity within the State from
emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will contribute significantly to nonattainment in ...any other state" with respect to the
NAAQS. 85 The "contribute significantly" language in the SIP provision is similar to "protect public health, 8' 6 a phrase which seems
"to refer to environmental8 7damage, not to environmental damage
measured in light of cost."
When faced with this expansive provision, the court evaluated
whether to allow cost considerations or to enforce an expansive
precautionary mandate. 8 Here the court decided that there is
82 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1058 (1995) ("The plain language of a provision
makes it clear that ... decisions are to be based on one criterion;" the EPA cannot base its
decision on other criteria.). See also Whitman v. ATA, 531 U.S. at 468 (2001) ("Congress,
we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms
or ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes." (citing
MCI Telcomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994))).
83 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
84 Id. at 677 ("In some contexts, 'significant' begs a consideration of costs."). See also
STIEPIIIN G. BRiFY:i .,Ri(iIARI) B. STIWARTI, CASS R. SUNSI:IN & MAITF1nW L. Si,'rrzljl,
AIMINISTR.ATIVI

LAW ANI) RI:UI.ATORY POICIY 71 (5th ed. 2000) ("[Clan an agency

sensibly decide whether a risk is 'significant' without also examining the cost of eliminating
it?").
85 CAA § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(l) (2000).
86 Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 677 ("The fundamental dispute is over the clarity of the
phrase 'contribute significantly.' Must EPA simply pick some flat 'amount' of contribution,
based exclusively on health concerns, such that any excess would put a state in the forbidden zone of 'significance'? Or was it permissible for EPA to consider differences in cutback costs, so that, after reduction of all that could be cost-effectively eliminated, any
remaining 'contribution' would not be considered 'significant'? In deciding on the permissible ceiling, EPA used 'significant' in the second way.").
87 Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles,99 Mi('ii. L. Ri:v. 1651, 1678 (2001).
88 Enforcing an expansive precautionary mandate, absent judicially-created default
rules, is, in my view, the only way to interpret these statutes consistently across cases and
consistently with the statutory text. Contra The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 608 (upholding
the "significant risk" requirement before regulating a toxic substance); Sunstein, supra
note 50, at 491 ("The 'significant risk' requirement has no textual basis. .. But the conclusion in the case was nonetheless sound."). For a discussion of the difficulty in harmonizing
The Benzene Case and Michigan v. EPA, see Sunstein, supra note 87, at 1678. But cost
considerations in Michigan v. EPA should not be allowed on the same grounds as in Amer-
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"nothing in the text, structure, or history of § 110(a)(2)(D) [of the
CAA] that bars EPA from considering cost in its application,"' 9
relying on D.C. Circuit precedent holding that "only where there is
'clear congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost' that
we find agencies barred from considering costs." 90 However,
between cost-benefit analysis and a precautionary mandate, the
preference should be a legislative choice, and courts should hold
Congress to their expansive and precautionary text. 91 Arguably
this view is consistent with the view of both D.C. Circuit Judges
Sentelle and Tatel. Sentelle, dissenting in Michigan v. EPA, and
Tatel, dissenting in Massachusetts v. EPA, each assert that the
respective expansive mandate at issue is clear under Chevron step
one.92 Thus, there was no reason to resort to D.C. Circuit precedent allowing cost consideration in the Michigan case, 9 3 and perhaps Judge Sentelle, had he not ruled on procedural standing
grounds in the Massachusetts case, might agree with the substantive
rationale in Tatel's dissent.

ican Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1994), because in the latter case, it
might have lead to more harm. Contra Sunstein, supra note 87, at 1679. See also infra Part
IV.
89 Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 679.
90 Id. at 678 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en banc); George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 622-24 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
reh'g granted, 164 F.3d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). See also ATA v. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457, 469
n.1 (2001) ("None of the sections of the CAA in which the District of Columbia Circuit has
found authority for the EPA to consider costs shares § 109(b)(1)'s prominence in the overall statutory scheme.").
91 Contra Sunstein, supra note 87, at 1716 (arguing that in the face of silences or ambiguities we should permit cost-benefit balancing). But see id. at 1679 ("It is not clear whether
the Supreme Court would approve the lower court's rejection of textualism...").
92 Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 697 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) ("I see nothing in [Chevron] that either compels or counsels the majority's result. EPA argues that Congress did
not define significant contribution. True, it did not. Neither did it define amount. But
neither EPA nor the majority have offered any reasonable interpretation of those words
which makes them depend upon or even relate to the cost effectiveness of alleviation ....
Because the majority's deference to EPA's unreasonable statutory interpretation as
couched in the agency's scurrilous 'second-step' cost effectiveness analysis ventures off
track, as I said, I am getting off at the first stop."); Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 67
(Tatel, J., dissenting) ("'If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is
the law and must be given effect.' . . . This language [of CAA § 202(a)(1)] plainly authorizes regulation of (1) any air pollutants emitted from motor vehicles that (2) in the
Administrator's judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9)).
93 Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 695-97 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51
F.3d 1053, 1060 (1995).
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While cost-benefit analyses in environmental statutes, as a matter of policy, may be preferable to expansive mandates, 94 Congress
must make this intent clear like it did in FIFRA. Some goods, like
pesticides, may be a net benefit, despite environmental harms, and
agencies are left to consider costs and engage in this calculus. At
the same time, there may be advantages to expansive mandates
without limitations. If we are deeply concerned with the risk of
some public health dangers or aware that a substance can cause
substantial harm but are uncertain of the probability of the harm
occurring, no limitations may be appropriate regardless of costs.
Expansive mandates without limitations and, in turn broad interpretation, also help to prevent public and environmental health
policy choices from being co-opted by administrative agencies who
might limit public protection possibly due to industrial lobbying or
executive branch politics.
Thus, the proposed model this Article suggests may please both
pragmatists (and other proponents of legislative history) and textualists. Justice Antonin Scalia, a self-proclaimed textualist,95 should
be pleased with great reliance on the text of the broad mandate,96
while preserving much of the institutional balance of the Chevron
doctrine 97 and the legal authority of judicial review.98 Justice Stephen Breyer, a pragmatist99 and proponent of legislative history, 100
94 In some ways this mirrors the debate between using cost-benefit analysis or the precautionary principle. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, The Precautionary
Principle as a Basis for Decision Making, 2 Tiin; E('oNOMIS'iS' VOcICE 1 (2005), availableat
http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol2liss2lart8 (last visited Apr. 8, 2006).
95 See generally SCALIA, supra note 49. Perhaps textualism, when faced with expansive
statutory mandates, will not erode environmental regulation and result in manipulation of
the Chevron doctrine. Contra Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretationof Environmental Law
in the Supreme Court's2003-04 Term, 42 HoUs. L. Ri;v. 565, 572-605 (2005). While some

may disagree, I would argue that even originalists can embrace a broad interpretive principle because, absent express contrary statements, when Congress uses expansive language it
may do so purposefully and with the knowledge that changing circumstances may affect
regulatory expectations.
96 Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in ATA v. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
97 See Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense
of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. Riv. 393, 395 (1996).
98 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
688 (1999) (opinion by Scalia, J.) ("The arguments recited in these sources have been
soundly refuted, and the position for which they have been marshaled has been rejected by
constitutional tradition and precedent as clear and conclusive, and almost as venerable, as
that which consigns debate over whether Marbury v. Madison was wrongly decided to
forums more other-worldly than ours.").
99 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist,and Empiricist,8
AFMIN. L.J. AM. U. 747, 749 (1995) ("Justice Breyer is a dedicated pragmatist.").
100 See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S.
CAL.. L. Riiv. 845, 847 (1994).
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should be pleased with deferring to administrative agencies where
technocratic expertise is required. 0 1
To summarize, judges should broadly interpret expansive environmental and public health legislation that seeks to limit public
harms, without consideration of other factors. 10 2 Judges have the
capacity to understand emerging science and have the constitutional responsibility to determine what harms should be regulated
under statutory mandates. In other words, for expansive environmental legislation, courts should liberally construe Chevron step
one 0 3 (i.e., expansive mandates should not be considered ambiguous, and instead courts should determine whether the potentially
regulated harm meets the textual requirements for a standard to be
issued). °4 To do otherwise may result in agency inaction (i.e., a
failure to regulate), and agencies should not have control over
global intent of the law.' 0 5 If the statute specifies other factors to
be considered against the mandate, however, this determination
can be left to the administrative agencies subject to scrutiny under
considerations,
Chevron step two. Agencies may balance explicit
06
but should not decide if and what to balance.1
101 STFI InN Bi u;Yi:iz, BRIAKING 'i:

Vicious Cin(i.ii: ToWARI) Eiii:CIiVi RISK Ri-061 (1993) (calling for creation of a health and environmental administrative
agency that would be "mission oriented, seeking to bring a degree of uniformity and
rationality to decision making in highly technical areas, with broad authority, somewhat
independent, and with significant prestige").
102 I recognize that there are substantial policy consequences to embracing the broad
interpretive principle suggested. For example, in the health case system, emergency rooms
are already closing, often in the poorest neighborhoods; arguably expedited by broad
EMTALA interpretations. Similarly, OSHA regulations may lead to fewer jobs, business
losses, and loss of health care benefits. However, if Congress is concerned with these
issues, the statutes should indicate whether these costs should be taken into consideration,
allowing an agency to determine the proper scope of regulation. In other words, Congress
should explicitly require cost-benefit analysis that focuses on the negative effect of the
regulation (not the regulated harm itself) on public welfare.
103 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) ("If a
court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had
an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
effect."); Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting)
(arguing that, under Chevron step one, EPA clearly has the textual authority to regulate
greenhouse gases), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006).
104 See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 445 ("An ambiguity is simply not a delegation of lawinterpreting power. Chevron confuses the two."); id. at 494 ("At the very least, courts
should answer in the affirmative when a statute contains an open-ended term like 'public
policy' . . . that invites interpretations that change over time... .
105 Cf Sunstein, supra note 78, at 289-90.
106 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 50, at 446 ("Those who are limited by a legal restriction
should not be permitted to determine the nature of the limitation, or to decide its scope.").
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THE SCOPE OF A BROAD INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLE

There are at least three circumstances in which expansive environmental legislation without limitations should not necessarily be
read broadly. The first circumstance is where regulation was
clearly not the intent of Congress at the time of the statute's enactment. This decision not to regulate must be clearly manifested by
Congress, or the regulation must be so obviously outside the scope
of what Congress likely envisioned, that no argument could be
made that Congress would have approved its regulation at the time
of enactment. The second circumstance is where broad construction would lead to an absurd result. Absurdity would have to be
more than an unbalanced cost-benefit analysis, but instead a situation where regulating the harm at issue in the relevant statute
would lead directly to the use of more harmful substances. The
third circumstance is where the proposed interpretive principle
that expansive legislation without express limitations should be
broadly interpreted is limited to environmental and public health
statutes regulating negative externalities.
First, when interpreting expansive textual language, what if a
broad interpretation conflicts with congressional intent or longstanding practice? 10 7 In order to overrule this interpretive principle-that expansive legislation without express limitation be
broadly interpreted by the courts-there must be clear congressional intent to do otherwise. The most noteworthy case addressing the issue of whether legislative action trumps the statutory text
is FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation.0 8 In 1996,
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") attempted to regulate
tobacco products, which contain nicotine, as "drugs" and "drug
delivery devices" under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
("FDCA").' 1 9 The court held that the FDCA, read in conjunction
with Congress' subsequent tobacco-related legislation, did not give
107For a general post-Chevron analysis of interpreting statutory text, see A]ii:n, C.
AMAN, JR. & WiiH11AM T. MAYTON, AIMINISIP.RAT1V

LAW 481-491 (2d ed. 2001).

108 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131-32 (2000).
109Id. at 127. The FDCA permits the FDA to regulate "drugs" ("articles (other than
food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body"), "device" ("an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance . . . or other similar or related article,
including any component, part, or accessory, which is ... intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body"), and "combination products" ("a combination of a drug, device,
or biological product"). 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(1)(C), 321(h), 353(g)(1) (2004). "The FDA
has construed this provision as giving it the discretion to regulate combination products as
drugs, as devices, or as both." Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 130 (citing 61 Fed. Reg.
44,400 (Aug. 28, 1996)).
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the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products as customarily
marketed in the United States. 10 Despite the Court's holding, the
expansive regulatory and definitional scope of the statute can be
read to include tobacco, and, as previously stated, the expansive,
yet clear, text should control in most circumstances,' 1 unless Connot
gress, at the time of enactment, made clear an explicit intention
1
to give the FDA the power to regulate tobacco products. 2
While "Congress enacted general words," Professor Sunstein
argues that "its beliefs about particular applications of those general words, and Congress's unenacted beliefs about those applications need not control." ' " 3 Sunstein goes on to state that "[e]ven
if... there were an express statement to this effect [that the FDA
was not authorized to regulate tobacco] in the legislative history, it
would not be controlling." ' 4 This conclusion can result in inconsistency-in the tobacco case, judges should look only at the statutory
text, but yet, in other cases, judges must look beyond the text
where changed circumstances might result in "perverse" regulation. 115 Statutory interpretation cannot depend on the resulting
110 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126.
1I In my view, the actual language (not taking into account the legislative history) is not
ambiguous, and can be read to include tobacco products. Accord id. at 161 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "tobacco products fit within this statutory language"); Cass R.
Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DIJKI"
L.J. 1013, 1028 (1998) (stating that "the text of the definition of 'drug' plainly includes
tobacco").
112 Cf Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 400 (1994) ("subsequent history is less illuminating
than contemporaneous evidence"); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("Arguments based on subsequent legislative history . . . should not be
taken seriously, not even in a footnote.").
113 Sunstein, supra note 111, at 1029.
114 Id. at 1031-32.
115 Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 ColtiJM. L.

Ri:v. 2071, 2099 (1990) (" . . . Congress would be unlikely to want agencies to have the
authority to decide on the extent of their own powers. To accord such power to agencies
would be to allow them to be judges in their own cause, in which they are of course susceptible to bias."), and Sunstein, supra note 111, at 1028 (stating that tobacco clearly falls
within the statutory definition of a drug), with Sunstein, supra note 50, at 496 ("Indeed the
[Delaney] clause, read literally, appeared quite perverse in many of its applications
because it banned substances that posed no real risk to health."), and Sunstein, supra note
87, at 1716 (arguing that in the face of silences or ambiguities we should permit cost-benefit
balancing). While textual inconsistency may result, Sunstein's recent response is that interpretive consistency does exist when substantial deference is given to the executive branch.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say What the Law Is, 115
YAIJi L.J. 2580 (2006). This view may be correct, in part. Sunstein argues that we should
"vindicate the law-interpreting authority of the executive branch." Id. at 3. Thus, Massachusetts v. EPA was correctly decided, but Brown & Williamson was not. Id. However, the
judiciary itself or through deference to an administrative agency should not subvert the
broad goals of expansive Congressional legislation. Sunstein's vision of judicial action ver-
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regulation, and expansive statutory language must be read broadly
except in a few circumstances including when legislative statements
make a statute unambiguously narrow under Chevron step one.
While Chevron recognizes that the resolution of ambiguities is a
policy judgment left to administrative agencies with democratic
accountability and technical expertise,' 16 clear congressional intent
is not an ambiguity. In Brown & Williamson, scholars (and the
Court's majority1 17) agree that, despite the plain language, the term
"drug" in the FDCA was not understood to include tobacco. 8
This is not to say Brown & Williamson was properly decided.
First, none of the legislative history cited by the Court's majority in
Brown & Williamson, nor scholars, is from the time of enactment
of the FDCA. Instead, the Court's majority cites to post-enactment legislative action." 19 Thus, Justice Breyer's dissent correctly
asserts that the majority's conclusion "is based on legislative
silence."' 2 0 Breyer states, "Congress itself has addressed expressly
the issue of the FDA's tobacco-related authority only once-and,
as I have said, its statement was that the statute was not to 'be
construed to affect the question of whether the [FDA] has any
authority to regulate any tobacco product.'"12' Second, there is no
reason to view well-explained regulation with suspicion simply
when it will result in a major policy change as the Court has implicitly recognized that Congress cannot keep up with all the scientific

sus my own is a choice between (1) a preference for deference in all cases to the executive
which may (e.g., Brown & Williamson) or may not (e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA) regulate
expansively versus (2) a preference for the judiciary to uphold or mandate regulatory
action in some cases (those without express limitations) based on expansive textual mandates (compare ATA v. Whitman with Massachusetts v. EPA). There is likely substantial
agreement in defining the interpretive principle governing statutes that contain express
limitations because executive deference is appropriate.
116 Sunstein, supra note 111, at 1058. It is not clear that Chevron deference should be
accorded an agency's interpretation of its own jurisdiction. Merrill, supra note 77, at 1089.
See also Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 115, at 25-26.
117 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143-159.
118 Sunstein, supra note 111, at 1029; Merrill, supra note 77, at 1080-82. This argument
gains momentum if jurisdiction over tobacco by the FDA would likely result in the end of
its sale. Id. at 1076 (citing Public Health Cigarette Amendments of 1971: Hearings Before
the Commerce Subcomm. on S. 1454, 92d Cong. 239 (1972); Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.
at 139 ("A ban of tobacco products by the FDA would therefore plainly contradict congressional policy.")).
119 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143-159.
120 Id. at 186 (Breyer, J.,dissenting).
121 Id. (citing the note following 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1994 Supp. Ill)).
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and technological progress.1 22 It is unconvincing that courts should
hesitate to allow regulation in extraordinary cases1 23 as scientific
discoveries may often require major policy changes. 24 In other
words, supposed reliance interests alone should not justify continuing (or, at a minimum, failing to regulate) a public health threat.
So the question properly phrased is whether Congress understood at the time of enactment that the FDCA did not allow the
regulation of tobacco products regardless of the health effects.
This question is a difficult one, and, maybe, as Brown & Williamson suggests, Congress would have said something if it wanted to
allow tobacco regulation; but this is speculation. There must be an
explicit statement that Congress does not want to regulate in light
of an expansive statutory mandate and the possibility of changed
circumstances. This conclusion forces reasoned Congressional
action (i.e., Congress can insert limitations) and allows for broad
mandates to protect public health and welfare.
Second, changed circumstances and science can cut both ways
when statutory interpretation is seen as impacting the balancing of
interests in making policy choices, especially in those attempts to
improve the environment and public health-in some instances the
text's scope arguably should be more limited (e.g., the Delaney
Clause example discussed below) and in other cases should arguably be read more expansively (e.g., regulating tobacco products
under the FDCA). In addition to clear congressional intent,
another limitation on expanding definitional scope is that of
absurdity. This absurdity exception should be defined narrowlywhere the result would be regulation that directly causes substantially more direct harm to human health than would otherwise be
prevented.
122Natl Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs, 125 U.S. 2688, 2699
(2005) (stating that unexplained inconsistency can be challenged under the Administrative
Procedure Act, but not the Chevron doctrine).
123Contra Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 (citing Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview
of Questions of Law and Policy, 30 AiMIN. L. Ri~v. 363, 370 (1986)) ("In extraordinary
cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has
intended such an implicit delegation.").
124 It is likely that Congress cannot anticipate most regulation. See supra note 54. But,
some may argue that if scientific understanding changes considerably that we should want
these things to go back to Congress to increase accountability (i.e., narrowly construe the
statute and wait for legislation). However, in most cases, Congress will not act to regulate
a singular item, and such frequent Congressional action would be inefficient. If a big regulatory change results from use of the broad interpretive principle, and Congress does not
want such regulation, then it can and should act. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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A prime example is the Delaney Clause which prohibits food

additives that "induce" cancer. 12 5 The Clause was passed before
carcinogens were easily detected and those able to be detected
were very dangerous. If, and only if, the Clause, as-applied to a
specific additive, increases health risks by forcing companies to
resort to substantially more dangerous but non-carcinogenic food
additives would it meet the absurdity canon, as regulation should
not create more harm.' 2 6 This exception, however, is not about
limiting the scope of the text and allowing de minimis exceptions.
While de minimis exceptions may be better policy, 127 Congress
should be left with its arguably poor policy choice. 128 The absurdity canon should only survive to the extent that regulation would
create substantially more harm (if in fact that is the case) through a
result in direct conflict with the purpose of any public health or

environmental statute.
Finally, the proposed interpretive principle that expansive legislation without express limitations should be broadly interpreted is
limited to environmental and public health statutes regulating negative externalities such as air pollution, water pollution, and toxic
substances. 29 While these externalities sometimes arise as a result
of beneficial action such as industrial growth, the externalities
125 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000). See also Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992),
decided prior to passage of the Food Quality Protection Act which created a new healthbased standard for pesticide residue on food. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2000).
126 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 50, at 497.
127 See BiiiY:i, supra note 101, at 41 (stating that, applied literally, the Delaney clause
seems "unreasonably and pointlessly strict").
128 See Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Contra Sunstein, supra
note 50, at 488-89, 496-97. See generally Richard A. Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the
Delaney Clause: Repudiation of CongressionalChoice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific
Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON Ri-. 1, 3 (1988) (depicting the FDA's de minimis policy as an

effort "to reconcile Congress's language with circumstances Congress may not have foreseen and for which it surely did not provide").
129 Some goods have a wide range of both benefits and hazards in consumers' distributional curves. See Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs:
Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HlIALT1I Poi.'y L. & Eritics 741 (2005) (arguing that drugs offer benefits to a heterogeneous population, and thus, at various points
upstream and downstream in the distributional curve, may be more helpful to some and
more harmful to others). See also Rodgers v. Elliot, 146 Mass. 349, 15 N.E. 768 (1888)
(where the harms (e.g., noise or plaintiff's convulsions), and benefits (e.g., notice of time of
day and start of church service) of the operation of defendant's church bell are variable
along geographic, wind, tolerance, and medical sensitivity distributional curves). Thus, in
regulating some consumer goods, Congress often enacts both screening and cost-benefit
statutes where agencies can take into consideration the scope of the regulation (e.g., standard-setting or use limitations); though at times the curve may be grossly disproportionate.
For example, consumer use of tobacco products (e.g. cigarettes) is unlike that of prescription drugs because the resulting effects of tobacco lack health benefits.
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themselves have little or no beneficial value, and the costs of a failure to regulate are potentially high because significant harm may
accrue in the time between narrow judicial construction of statutory provisions and any future congressional or administrative
action.
V.

CONCLUSION

Courts are both expected to say what the law is and to defer
policy choices to better positioned administrative agencies. Yet too
often, depending on the individual policy outcome, the interpretation of expansive environmental legislation is often inconsistentsometimes wanting textual strength; sometimes judicial policymaking.1 30 Strong textual commitments, absent other interpretive
tools, can lead to both over- and under-inclusive environmental
regulation. Even so, courts should be wary of circumventing
expansive statutory mandates. Instead courts should hold Congress to their expansive goals and only allow agency limitation of
these goals when expressly provided by Congress.
Under this more consistent interpretive principle, greenhouse
gases would be regulated under the Clean Air Act, wetlands fill
31
would be subject to broad federal jurisdiction, and tobacco
would be subject to FDA regulation (unless timely legislative history is found), all under appropriate standards determined by
agency expertise. At the same time, cancer-inducing food additives
would be prohibited unless the substitutes would do substantially
more harm, and judicially created cost-benefit default rules would
disappear to be replaced by Congressional ones. At his confirmation hearing, Chief Justice John Roberts stated,
I depart from some views of original intent in the sense
that those folks, some people view it as meaning just the
conditions at the time, just the particular problem. I think
you need to look at the words they used, and if the
words
32
adopt a broader principle, it applies more broadly.

Thus, courts should broadly construe expansive environmental
and public health legislation because (1) judges are equipped to
interpret the statutory mandate, (2) Congress, in recognition of
130 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
131 See supra note 129.
132 Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005).
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changed circumstances, is aware of the breadth of their textual language, and (3) the public and environment cannot afford the
potential costs of narrow interpretation.

